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Chapter 8
Rebuilding Workers’ Retirement Security: A
Labor Perspective on Private Pension Reform
Damon Silvers
This chapter looks at issues of risk, funding, and benefit design in the US
private pension system, with particular attention to the labor movement’s
interest in obtaining retirement security for America’s working families.
The chapter seeks to address the question of how to best develop public
policies that would encourage broad-based retirement provisions sufficient
to provide most Americans with a comfortable retirement.
The labor movement created retirement in the United States. Prior to
the rise of the labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s, old age meant
poverty or economic dependence for most Americans (Epstein 1922;
Altman 2005).1 A privileged few received company or government pensions
(Seburn 1991). A pension was seen as a special reward for loyal service, and
was associated with the top echelon of white-collar workers. The wealthy lived
in comfort in retirement off of their accumulated wealth, that is, their
savings. Of course, the world of the early twentieth century was demographi-
cally different in two key ways – people died earlier andmore people lived on
farms.2 Prior to the development of social insurance, workers often formed
unions to directly provide health care, pensions, and life insurance (Ghilar-
ducci 2008). Direct collective insurance rather than bargaining with employ-
ers was the primary function of many unions, making unions often hard to
distinguish from insurance companies and mutual aid societies.3
Post-New Deal America was a world of large public and private sector
employers, with rising living standards and relatively high levels of unioni-
zation.4 Collective bargaining set the pattern for labor markets not only
for the workers directly covered by union contracts, but also for large
employers as a whole (Freeman and Medoff 1984). This period was char-
acterized by rapidly rising wages and productivity, rising life expectancy,
and shrinking farm employment (Price and Spriggs 2005; BLS 2009a).
These were the years that produced the concept of retirement being
founded on a three-legged stool – Social Security, a pension, and personal
saving (Chao 2007).
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Since 1980, the United States has become a different kind of economy,
with different demographics. Industrial employment has declined dramat-
ically, as have traditional employment relationships generally (Estreicher
1993).5 While workers still tend to have longer job tenure in middle age,
there has been an increase in job changes over a career since 1980 (Munnell,
Haverstick, and Sanzenbacher 2006). Life expectancy has grown dramatical-
ly, as have health-care costs (Fronstin and Salisbury 2003; Feldstein 2008).
And most importantly, from the perspective of retirement policy, the labor
movement has weakened dramatically, particularly in the private sector.6
While all of these developments have contributed to the fraying of the
post-World War II retirement fabric, it is the decline of the labor movement
that has ensured that, instead of responding to economic and demographic
change, our retirement systems have crumbled. What remains – tax-favored
saving accounts in the form of 401(k)s and the like – have proven to be poor
substitutes for pensions because they lack key social insurance functions that
the traditional pension provided.
The challenge we now face as a society is whether we want to perpetuate
retirement as part of the life experience of most Americans, or instead
return to a twenty-first century version of the state of affairs that existed at
the beginning of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, we face this choice
in the context of daunting circumstances. Our demographic history is with
us in the form of the baby boomers. Even before the collapse of the capital
markets in the fall of 2008, early baby boomers appeared to be the last
cohort to enjoy better retirement prospects than their parents (Butrica and
Uccello 2005). The fall in the equities markets and the residential real
estate markets has likely made this situation far worse in recent times.
The implications for the US economy in the coming years are very
serious. Low incomes for older Americans will mean less aggregate de-
mand. They will also mean higher workforce participation, but often in
less demanding and thus less productive jobs. Already, youth employment
experts are pointing to the unusual persistence of baby boomers in the
workforce in entry-level jobs, effectively diminishing entry-level opportu-
nities for younger workers (Sum, Khatiwada, and Palma 2005).
While it is possible to envision ways of rebuilding America’s private sector
retirement system, it will be extraordinarily difficult to design and provide
meaningful solutions for baby boomers in their 50s, simply because there is
not enough time.
In this context, the labor movement faces the choice of whether to focus
on defending what remains of the traditional retirement system, or to look to
the creation of a more broad-based sustainable system of retirement provi-
sion. This choice is tied up with broader choices that all labor movements
face at all times, between a narrow focus on improving the lives of current
union members and broad efforts to improve the lives of all workers.
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In the aftermath of World War II, when the labor movement was strong
and growing, a similar choice emerged around retirement security. Some
advocated increasing Social Security to the point where it could function as
a stand-alone retirement security system, but ultimately the labor move-
ment focused on winning pensions through collective bargaining in
organized workplaces (Lowenstein 2008). This strategy appeared, for a
time, to have almost produced universal pension coverage in large work-
places – pension coverage peaked around 50 percent in the 1970s when
private sector union density was less than 30 percent (Freeman 1997: 60–1).
But this success did not endure. Now, a much weakened labor movement
faces similar choices, as it concurrently confronts decisions about how
much of its remaining resources to expend on policy relating to the right
to organize and health care.
The remainder of this chapter will look at broad-based approaches to
retirement security, designed both to address the disintegration of tradi-
tional pension plans, and the failure of corporate pseudo-individualism
represented by the 401(k) plan. The discussion will sketch how the individ-
ualistic promise of the 401(k) plan – you determine whether to fund your
plan, you determine how to invest your plan, and you can withdraw funds
for other needs – all turn out to have perverse consequences. Ironically,
these results are now known and acknowledged even by 401(k) advocates.
The consequence is that companies and consultants now propose new plan
designs consciously intended to counteract the flaws in the 401(k) model –
with default contribution provisions, service providers offering customers
customized guidance on how to invest their accounts, and employers
seeking to persuade employees not to withdraw funds prematurely from
their accounts.
Conversations about these issues take on a peculiar quality, as successively
each supposed advantage of saving accounts is renounced by their advocates,
along with the logic supporting them. In the end, the listener is left wonder-
ing: if employees are unable to make investment decisions on their own and,
if purely voluntary contributions are ineffective, why do we not return to real
(traditional) pensions?
Problems in retirement security
Money
The retirement security crisis is a problem of money. While there are
inferior and superior ways of managing retirement assets, there is no way to
provide retirement security without adequate funding. The history of retire-
ment provision in the private sector since 1980 is the history of employers
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replacing defined benefit (DB) pension plans, which were funded on aver-
age by employer contributions worth 8 percent of payroll, with voluntary
saving plans such as 401(k)s, where average employer contributions are less
than 3 percent of payroll (Munnell and Sundén 2006; Munnell, Aubry, and
Muldoon 2008).
Of course, workers generally have the choice of putting more money in
their 401(k) plans. Even before the recent steep increases in contribution
limits, all but the highest-income workers could set aside 10 percent of their
income on a pretax basis to their 401(k) plans. But in practice only a very few
workers do so. The result is that median 401(k) account balances before the
financial crisis were $19,000, while median account balances for the typical
household approaching retirement age were $50,500 in a combination of
401(k) and individual retirement accounts (IRAs) in 2007 (VanDerhei et al.
2007; Munnell, Golub-Sass, and Muldoon 2009). The General Accounting
Office has predicted that 401(k), IRA, and other retirement saving accounts
will replace only 22 percent of annualized career earnings and 37 percent of
workers will retire with a zero balance (USGAO 2007). By comparison, it
costs about $250,000 to buy a fixed life annuity sufficient to replace 40 per-
cent of the median family income of $48,000.7
This employer retreat from funding pensions was contagious. Once one
employer in an industry had cut pension costs by moving to a 401(k),
others followed suit. In industries where multiemployer pensions were
predominant, the rise of non-pension providing employers was even
more destructive, as it directly reduced the funding base of multiemployer
plans (Traffic World 2007; Millonzi 2008;UPS 2009).
The lesson of this experience is that, like health care, pension coverage is
sustainable when it is universal and involves a minimum percentage of
payroll. There are really only two ways of achieving this goal – the reinvigo-
ration of the collective bargaining process or a government mandate.
There are a number of international models for this type of approach,
including, prominently, Australia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (Harris
2000; Rix 2005; Ponds and van Riel 2007; Clare 2008). In each case, govern-
mentmandated pension coverage and pension funding has emerged against
the backdrop of strong labor movements.
Effective retirement systems aiming at income replacement ranges in the
area of 30–40 percent need to be funded at no less than 8 percent of payroll.8
Voluntary schemes relying on employee contributions will not reach these
levels, nor have they done so historically or on a comparative international
basis. Because of the regressive distribution of voluntary contributions – that
is, high-income individuals voluntarily contribute not just higher dollar
amounts, but much higher percentages of salary – tax-favored treatment of
voluntary saving structures ends up being one of the most regressive and
least effective tax expenditures (Ghilarducci 2008: 20–1).
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Naturally, the precise institutional form of mandatory pensions varies
from country to country, and in some countries individual saving accounts
are similar to elements of US 401(k) plan structures (Rix 2005; Ponds and
van Riel 2007; Clare 2008). Adequate funding does not make the flaws of
the 401(k) model go away, but it removes the most serious flaw – too little
money.
Investment management
Investment management is about expertise and bargaining power. In a DB
plan or a pooled investment plan, the pension beneficiary has expertise
and some level of market power as a result of pooling the resources of many
beneficiaries. Plans with individual accounts, unless modified, provide the
beneficiary with neither expertise nor bargaining power. The result is
substantially higher cost of money management and lower risk-adjusted
returns across plan participants (Buck Consultants 2000; Levitz 2008).
The management of retirement assets is about two separate tasks: asset
allocation and the management of funds within the allocation. With the
exception of some individual IRAs, virtually all US retirement funds are
professionally managed within a given asset allocation – in the case of 401
(k) plans, by mutual fund managers. The issue in the area of picking
individual investment assets is not whether the money is managed profes-
sionally, but how the fees and other terms are negotiated. Here we have a
stark contrast between the bargaining power of collective trusts and that of
individual employees. The combination of weak bargaining power and
additional administrative costs of individual accounts leads the cost struc-
ture of money management for defined contribution (DC) plans to gener-
ally be far greater than the costs of DB plans.
In the area of asset allocation, however, the change from professional
management to self-directed investment represents a loss of expertise in
the management of retirement assets. Furthermore, as discussed later, the
full exposure of individuals to market risk leads rational employees to make
more conservative asset allocation decisions, because of a rational fear of
exposure to volatility that a pooled approach to retirement security has a
better ability to withstand.
Market risk
Of course, all funded plans are exposed to market risk. Like banks and
other financial intermediaries, both DB and DC plans seek to receive
compensation for taking investment risk. However, there is a fundamental
difference between the nature of the exposure to market risk taken by DB
and DC plans. In DB plans, the obligation to pay benefits is pooled among
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beneficiaries through time. The obligation to pay benefits is fixed, and the
fund holds, or should hold, enough assets to meet current obligations and
invest to fund future obligations. By contrast, in DC plans with individual
accounts, each person’s account is a kind of mini-fund, with one set of
payment obligations to one person during one fixed time frame.
Exposure to market risk creates the real possibility of DC participants
reaching retirement age at a time when capital markets are depressed,
particularly equity markets. This issue of market timing can expose DC
participants to the risk of unacceptable losses, losses which can severely
impact their standard of living in retirement (Weller 2005). Though this
risk can be lessened by slowly converting equity holdings to debt holdings,
prolonged bear markets limit the effectiveness of this strategy. The only way
within the DC structure to address this problem is to maintain high fixed-
income allocations – which some DC participants do – much to the dismay
of academic and policy commentators who note the cost of this strategy in
terms of returns (Mitchell and Utkus 2004; Munnell and Sundén 2004;
Benartzi and Thaler 2007).
Ironically, there is an entire academic literature devoted to the propo-
sition that DB plans should be invested entirely in bonds, while DC
participants are underinvested in equities (JAAA/SA 2006). The opposite
is true, assuming the DC participants’ plans are their major retirement
asset after Social Security, and assuming the DB plan is demographically
healthy.
This issue of market timing is embedded within the larger issue of
exposure to market losses. DB plans provide what their name suggests: a
fixed benefit. At one level, this means no direct exposure to market risk.
But DB plans still have to fund those obligations, which expose participants
indirectly to market risk. Here, the risk is not that of short-term volatility,
but rather of long-term secular decline in the capital markets of the kind
that has not occurred in the developed world in modern times.
Nonetheless, regulatory and accounting regimes can undo much of the
value of DB plans, as an absorber of market volatility, by requiring plans to
behave as if they were facing liquidation at all times, or by punishing plan
sponsors for market volatility that the plan can in fact absorb. The recent
direction of both generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) ac-
counting and more importantly of Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) regulation has had this effect (United States Congress 2006a;
FASB 2009).
Employer credit risk
The other side of the coin of market timing risk is employer credit risk,
perhaps the most serious issue for US DB plans. This occurs because the
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single employer plan system allows solvent employers to withdraw from
providing retirement security to their employees by freezing or terminating
pension plans. The result for employees in terms of final average salary
calculations and benefit accruals can be disastrous. In multiemployer
plans, the failure of individual employers to honor commitments made to
the fund, or their desire to withdraw from a fund, can destabilize the
finances of the fund as a whole, affecting the benefits of employees of
other firms. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) has of-
fered effective partial insurance against employer credit risk for a genera-
tion. However, there is no question that, as employers withdraw from
providing retirement security for their employees, the number of private
sector DB pension plans will shrink and the PBGC’s insurance pool will
become destabilized.
Employer credit risk in the context of employee benefits, more generally,
has been a major issue in the auto industry crisis. Nevertheless, the real
issue in this area has been unfunded retiree health benefit obligations,
whose value was being driven by projections of infinitely increasing health-
care costs. These retiree health benefit obligations ultimately led to the
creation and funding of voluntary employee beneficiary associations
(VEBAs; Eisenbrey 2009). In the recent GM and Chrysler bankruptcies,
the VEBAs have ended up as large shareholders of both firms as a result of
converting a large portion of those companies’ obligations to their respec-
tive VEBAs into equity (Eisenbrey 2009). GM and Chrysler’s pension plans,
on the other hand, were funded and have continued through the bank-
ruptcy of both companies (Gettelfinger, Holiefield, and Payne 2009;
Gettelfinger, Rapson, and Payne 2009). While there is certainly continued
employer credit risk through those plans, as with all single employer plans,
neither of those plans has failed.
The case of Delphi, the auto parts maker spun off from GM, shows both
the salience of funding issues in the context of employer credit risk and the
dangers beneficiaries face when employers seek to escape benefit obliga-
tions. In contrast with GM’s relatively well-funded plan, Delphi began
cutting back on pension contributions almost from the moment of its
spin-off from GM, leaving its plan unable to weather the market volatility
of this decade (Walsh 2009). In July 2009, the PBGC took over the Delphi
plan, causing its beneficiaries to have their benefits drop to PBGC guaran-
teed levels (Walsh 2009). The United Auto Workers (UAW) protected its
members against this possibility by having GM guarantee pension benefits
of Delphi employees represented by the UAW (Walsh 2009). Management
participants in Delphi’s plan were not thus protected.
Employer credit risk is also significant for DC plans in two ways, both of
which could easily be fixed. It is a minor, if widespread, problem when
financially weak employers refuse to pass on employee or employer
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contributions to employee accounts (Burton 2005). On a much larger, and
at times, catastrophic scale, employer credit risk presents itself when DC
plans are invested in employer stock (Altman 2002; Feder 2002; Lim 2008).
Employer stock is, of course, both volatile and junior in the capital struc-
ture to employer fixed obligations to DB plans. Ironically, ERISA limits the
amount of employer stock that can be held in DB plans, where funding
losses create a senior employer obligation, but are not limited in DC plans,
where there is no further employer backup to employee losses (United
States Congress 1974).
Employer credit risk in both its DB form and its DC form is the logical
consequence of trying to design a system of retirement security that simul-
taneously seeks to be a finance tool for firms and an employee retention
incentive. While any retirement plan can be a way for employers to attract
and retain employees, non-portable plans with cliff vesting have a special
retaining power. But along with that power comes an unavoidable expo-
sure to employer credit risk. In DC plans, employer stock is an inexpensive
way to finance retirement and provide capital to a firm. Of course, along
with these financing advantages to the firm comes the firm-specific risk for
the employee.
Longevity risk
A DB plan, like any other basic annuity, is a form of insurance against the
possibility of outliving one’s saving. A traditional pension promises a
stream of payments for the remainder of the participant’s life. By contrast,
a retirement saving account like a 401(k) is simply that – an account which,
when it is depleted, is no more.
The shift from DB to DC plans has eliminated the longevity insurance
aspect of employee benefit plans. In the DB world, the increased popularity
of cash balance plans and cash payout options has a similar effect, though,
of course, employees still have the options in these circumstances to leave
their money in their pension plans and participate in the longevity insur-
ance feature of such plans.
DC plan participants always have the option of annuitizing their plan
balances at retirement through private providers of annuity contracts. Such
an option involves taking on the credit risk of annuity providers, although
until recently it was easy to contract with a highly rated insurer, and
annuities are further backed by state insurance guarantee funds. A greater
problem has long been the opacity of annuity structures and the high
transaction costs associated with annuitizing retirement accounts with
private parties, compared to the costs implicit in pension funds, particular-
ly large pension funds.
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In recent decades, advances in medical care and consequent increases in
life expectancy have made the issue of longevity risk of greater concern to
participants, plan sponsors, and insurers. One of the troubling aspects of
longevity risk may well be that one of the main reasons for low levels of
annuitization among 401(k) participants is that annuitization results in
payment streams much lower than that expected by plan participants.
Sadly, the annuity terms, while in part reflecting a high fee margin for
the annuity company, may largely be driven by the realities of longevity risk
and the amount of money that must be set aside to provide for it.
Portability and early withdrawals
Portability is the great success of the DC plan revolution. Although porta-
bility within industries and geographical areas had always been a feature of
multiemployer pension plans, there was no full portability in the multiem-
ployer sector, and generally no portability between firms in the single
employer pension sector. 401(k) plans brought with them portability
throughout the entire economy, and the ability to enter and leave
the workforce without having any disproportionate impact on retirement
saving.
Full portability should have contributed to a much more effective level of
lifetime retirement provision. This is because mobile younger workers
could have accumulated retirement saving starting from the beginning of
their workforce participation, rather than waiting until they had found
long-term jobs a decade or more into their working lives. Although we
lack a full time series to evaluate, initial indications are that full portability
in the context of the typical 401(k) plans has not led to a more effective
level of lifetime retirement provision.
Furthermore, along with portability came the right to withdraw money
from retirement accounts. Even though the tax code imposes a 10 percent
surcharge on any such preretirement withdrawal, this surcharge appears to
be relatively ineffective in encouraging younger workers to roll over 401(k)
plans, rather than cash them out when they change jobs (Munnell and
Sundén 2004; Weller 2008).
In periods of stagnant wages or tight credit, workers have particularly
strong incentives to use their retirement accounts as sources of consumer
finance or as rainy-day funds. A particularly tragic form of this is the instinct
to draw down on retirement savings during unemployment or financial
crisis. Although the heyday of DB plans was also a period of economic
cycles that brought with it industrial unemployment, in those days, it was
impossible for workers in the postwar era to tap their pension funds.
While preretirement withdrawals from retirement plans can be harmful
to participants’ retirement security, withdrawals in times of economic
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hardship may be particularly problematic; unless they are financed from
sources outside the workers’ accounts, withdrawals necessarily involve sell-
ing assets at depressed prices, locking in what would otherwise be paper
losses.
In this respect, accessing almost any other source of emergency funds
may be preferred to facilitating emergency withdrawals from benefit plans.
Such other sources could include extended unemployment benefits, eased
consumer bankruptcy provisions, universal health care, more direct aid for
college students, and the like. As an aside, personal financial crises of the
sort that lead to a temptation to withdraw money from retirement ac-
counts usually turn out to be health-care cost related (Himmelstein et al.
2005).
Regulation
It has long been observed by plan sponsors that the regulatory environ-
ment surrounding DB plans has contributed to their decline, particularly
compared to the relatively light regulatory environment for DC plans. The
passage of the Pension Protection Act and its implementation in the
context of the financial crisis that began in 2007 have only added to these
complaints (Manning 2008; ERIC 2009).
There are several ironies to this situation. The first irony is that DB
pensions that are backed up by the full credit of employers are more heavily
regulated than plans where employees’ money is fully at risk. Of course,
there are historical and analytical reasons for this paradox, most impor-
tantly the long-standing combination of concerns that plan sponsors would
either underfund plans or overfund them for the purposes of tax evasion,
in the context of a regulatory regime where plan termination and fund
recapture were possible. Nonetheless, one clear benefit of moving away
from pension fund dependence on individual employer credit risk and
employer management of pension capital would be to lessen the need for
such detailed regulatory oversight of pension-funding issues. On the other
hand, there is a clear and immediate need to strengthen the regulation of
DC plans around issues like employer stock, mutual fund fees, and conflicts
of interest in areas like investment advice where the Pension Protection Act
actually radically weakened participant protections against conflicts of
interest (United States Congress 2006b; Bullard 2009).
A pension agenda that works for all
In 2006, the AFL-CIO Executive Council (2006) passed a resolution laying
out principles for broad-based pension reform. In the 3 years since, the
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AFL-CIO has worked with the Pension Rights Center (PRC) to formulate a
pension reform agenda based on principles adopted in 2006, and now
involving a broad coalition of pension and retiree advocates (PRC 2007).
In pursuing these agendas, the labor movement has operated in an intel-
lectual landscape defined on the right by proposals for universal voluntary
saving accounts coming from the Brookings Institution, and on the left
by proposals for national DB programs such as that put forward by
Teresa Ghilarducci under the auspices of the Economic Policy Institute
(Ghilarducci 2008: 237–90).
The thoughts that follow are not the official position of the AFL-CIO;
rather they represent an effort to outline a possible program for addressing
the problems outlined earlier, in the context of a national retirement
policy consistent with the AFL-CIO’s goals.
Mandatory retirement contributions
Any serious discussion of solving America’s retirement security crisis must
mandate a level playing field on contribution levels, and part of that
mandate must be an employer contribution. In Australia, the mandatory
contribution level is 9 percent of salary (Rix 2005); Teresa Ghilarducci
suggests 5 percent for the United States (Ghilarducci 2007). Of course,
there is a trade-off between comprehensiveness and percentage amounts. If
the contribution is applied to all income (e.g., all payments recorded on
Form 1099 and Schedule C of the Tax Code as well as on wages), then the
percentage of payroll required could be lower.
There is also the issue of who technically makes the contributions. While
economic theory tells us it should make no difference, the experience of
the last 30 years suggests that both workers and employers perceive a
difference in who pays. Employers are often unable to pass on the entire
impact of mandatory employer contributions to their employees, and
employees perceive deductions from their paycheck as a net loss of income
compared to employers having to make contributions to a fund. The
choice is whether society wants to encourage an overall higher level of
wages, in which case we would tilt toward making the mandatory contribu-
tions come from the employer, or whether we wish to compete internation-
ally on the basis of low labor costs, in which case we would seek to have
retirement plans funded with direct employee contributions.
Portability and withdrawal issues
Any practical system of universal pension coverage conceptually requires
benefit portability. Portability is often treated as somehow at odds with
providing a DB pension, though in the United States, Social Security is a
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giant, portableDBpension scheme.On amore limited scale, for generations,
multiemployer plans have provided portable DB coverage to employees
within particular industries.
What portability requires is either a standard accounting framework that
can be applied across plans, or a scheme in which workers can participate
in as they move from one employer to another. There are two options here,
which would be most effective if combined. The first option is plans that
people can participate in as they move from employer to employer – much
as Social Security allows one to move from one company to the next. The
second option is a common currency and set of benefit transfer rules for all
tax-exempt plans, with the logical administrator of such a system being a
government entity.
Mandatory portability must limit withdrawals from funds. One possibil-
ity would be a complete ban on preretirement withdrawals, perhaps with
some sort of extraordinary administrative procedure for hardship situa-
tions such as terminal illnesses. In some respect, this achieves better
outcomes than higher excise taxes – there is some reason to believe
younger workers would still take the withdrawals and incur much higher
taxes, which defeats the policy objectives. Historically, DB plans offered
no ability to cash out early in life, and in the United States, Social Security
offers no such option. An additional factor to consider here is that midlife
withdrawals from 401(k) plans often occur in the context of health-care
expenditure emergencies; a universal health-care system would remove
this need.
Asset management
Collective professional management of retirement assets is clearly more
cost-effective than individual amateur management of those assets. When
401(k) advocates talk about the need for investment advice, they are
conceding this point. Encouraging cost-effective retirement asset manage-
ment means channeling retirement assets into collective management
vehicles. Similarly, it is advantageous for retirement plans to provide not
just a vehicle for saving, but also insurance against investment and longevity
risk. There are real costs to providing this type of insurance, just as there is a
real risk-return trade-off around investment allocation.
Nevertheless, telling workers with existing 401(k) accounts that they
must give up those accounts and their existing account balances is neither
politically realistic nor necessarily good policy. A wiser approach would be
to foster the creation of large investment management pools with clear
government-monitored investment characteristics and low fees.
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Social insurance and the fate of the 401(k)
Our model might resemble Australian superannuation funds or existing
large US public pension funds, and it would involve several possible
options: a traditional DB plan, a low risk (largely fixed income) DC plan,
and a higher risk plan (mixed equity and debt). Such large multi-industry
funds should be able to attract the bulk of both employers and participants
because they would offer low fees, professional management, and relieve
employers of the administrative burden of managing their own benefit
plans. On the other hand, employers who wanted to offer particularly
generous benefits or customized structures to attract or retain employees
would be free to do so. Under such a policy, participants in existing DC
and DB plans would be allowed to continue to participate in those plans if
they chose – assuming these existing plans conformed to the minimum
contribution and withdrawal regulation requirements. This would allow
for plans that exceeded the minimum contribution requirements, and it
would allow for workers to have the benefit of past accruals in DB plans,
and for DC participants to remain with their existing plan options if they
wished.
Finally, any serious effort at universal retirement income security would
likely require compulsory annuitization at retirement. Hence, this ap-
proach ends up requiring insurance against longevity risk, but not against
market timing risk. There is an issue with annuitization involving pooling
the differing life expectancies of different occupational groups and income
levels. One big national annuity pool could have the unintended conse-
quence of a regressive subsidy toward higher income, higher life expectan-
cy white-collar workers, and from lower income and lower life expectancy
blue-collar workers. The alternative of mandating that all participate in a
DB structure would be the only way to effectively require insurance against
market timing risk. For reasons discussed earlier, this does not seem to be a
realistic option.
An alternative choice in the context of economic
crisis: expanding Social Security
The policy program described earlier is likely to involve a dramatic increase
in the level of saving in the United States. But this could have a negative
impact on consumer spending and aggregate demand, unless accompa-
nied by the immediate deployment of the saving in job-creating activities
such as infrastructure projects or large-scale responses to challenges in
areas like energy and auto manufacturing. Even given large-scale invest-
ment of the saving, the net impact on economic activity could be negative
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in the near term. Should our economy remain weak enough such that this
is a valid consideration, policymakers might learn from the experience of
New Deal policymakers in a similar situation. Rather than increasing sav-
ing, those policymakers created Social Security, a retirement program
where the tax dollars raised by the program were immediately deployed
in the economy in the form of benefits.
This logic would suggest dealing with dwindling retirement security by
enacting measures to boost the income that Social Security provides its
recipients. Such an increase in benefits would be funded entirely on a pass-
through basis by current increases in tax revenues, separate and apart from
the management of the Social Security Trust Fund. It would be difficult to
make the transition from an expanded Social Security to a funded universal
pension plan, for some of the same reasons that bedeviled the Bush
Administration’s effort to privatize Social Security.
Conclusion
Post-World War II economic growth offered a middle class standard of
living to the majority of Americans. Part of the American Dream was the
promise of retirement in dignity, and collective bargaining was the primary
vehicle for the realization of that promise. Since the 1950s, the labor move-
ment has weakened and life expectancies have dramatically increased, as has
the economy’s exposure to foreign competition. But at the same time, the
nation has grown dramatically more wealthy. As DB pension coverage
shrinks and 401(k) balances remain low, there is reason to worry that
retirement once again will become a privilege of the affluent. But this
trend is the outcome of choices made in the recent past. If these trends
continue, it will be because we chose not to make retirement a priority:
because policymakers decided our wealth was better spent in other ways than
in keeping the American Dream alive in our old age. The labor movement
takes the position that, along with health care and the right to have workers’
voices heard in the workplace and the public arena, the right to a comfort-
able retirement defines a civilized society, and we need to act to revive that
right as a living aspect of how our society functions.
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Notes
1 ‘Surveys by Wisconsin and New York, published in 1925 and 1929 respectively,
found that over half of the population aged 65 and older had “insufficient
subsistence income” ’ (Altman 2005: 8).
2 In the United States in 1900, life expectancy at birth was 47.3 years; by 2005, life
expectancy at birth was 77.8 years (NCHS 2007). In 1930, 43.9 percent of the
population lived in rural areas; in 2008, only 16.5 percent of the population lived
in rural areas (USCB 1993; USDA 2009).
3 In the 1880s, unions and mutual aid societies were often indistinguishable. In the
1920s, the American Federation of Labor founded its own insurance company,
the Union Labor Life Insurance Company, and in 1929, the International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers established the first multiemployer benefit plan
(Ullico 2005; Ghilarducci 2008: 240–1). By 1930, union pension plans covered
20 percent of all union members, while corporate pension plans covered only
15 percent of the private sector workforce (Latimer 1932; Ghilarducci 1992: 30).
4 Union density was greater than 30 percent from 1943 until 1960 (Freeman 1997:
59–60).
5 For a discussion on the increasing use of temporary employment arrangements,
contract arrangements, and the misclassification of employees as independent
contractors, see Ruckelshaus (2008).
6 Only 7.6 percent of the private sector workforce is unionized (BLS 2009b).
7 Annuity prices are widely available on the Internet. As of the drafting of this
chapter, the calculator cited showed that a lifetime annuity paying $1,600 per
month would cost $250,000 (NewRetirement, LLC 2009).
8 By comparison, Social Security provides a benefit in the range of 30–40 percent of
preretirement income of the median worker at a cost of 12.4 percent of payroll.
An extremely efficiently managed funded plan could achieve 30 percent replace-
ment rates for around 8 percent. The typical DC plan, however, is likely to be less
inefficient due to small size.
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